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ABSTRACT: What is it for an utterance of an expression to lack meaning? In this paper 
I address the issue along the lines of Carnap’s seminal article “Empiricism, Semantics 
and Ontology”. Carnap provides there an answer to the above question, which he 
then uses to argue that certain claims of metaphysics are meaningless. In the first 
section of the paper I present Carnap’s argument for the meaninglessness of certain 
metaphysical claims. In the second section I argue that, although the argument is 
not compelling, the main virtue of Carnap’s proposal is the strategy he develops for 
generating meaningless uses of language. In the third section I propose an externalist 
criterion of meaningless uses of expressions that relies on semantic externalist con-
siderations. This, I argue, bears significant resemblances to Carnap’s proposal. In the 
last section I discuss the applicability of the new criterion to the question concerning 
the meaning of metaphysical claims.
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I. Carnap’s dialectical purposes
One of Carnap’s aims in his “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950) 
is to argue that certain metaphysical claims are meaningless and so should 
not be taken as serious philosophical hypotheses.1 Quine is one philosopher 
that Carnap has in mind. The crucial point of disagreement concerns the 
metaphysical consequences Quine draws from his criterion of ontological 
commitment. Quine famously argued in his “On What There Is” (1948) that 
it is neither the proper names of a theory, nor the general terms that occur 
1 I am grateful to Andrei Marasoiu and especially to Ekain Garmendia for extensive com-
ments and suggestions on a previous version of this paper. 
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in it, that express its ontological commitments. In the former case the reason 
is, according to Quine, that names are eliminable using Russell’s theory of 
descriptions. In the latter case Quine invoked a behaviourist account of the 
meaning of general terms (Quine 1948: 11). Instead, he argued, “a theory is 
committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of 
the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made 
in the theory be true” (1948: 13–14). According to Quine, if mathematics 
quantifies over variables that receive numbers as values it expresses commit-
ment to a metaphysical thesis, in particular, that there are numbers. Given 
that numbers are classes, and classes are abstract entities, Quine argues, math-
ematics expresses commitment to there being abstract entities.2
Carnap (1950) is not convinced by Quine’s argument. He replies that it 
is a mistake to think that we can infer consequences pertaining to traditional 
metaphysics from the claims of existence that we find in specific areas of 
scientific discourse. A premise of Carnap’s argument is that sentences such as 
‘There are numbers’ can be understood in two ways:
it is above all necessary to recognize a fundamental distinction between two 
kinds of questions concerning the existence or reality of entities. If someone 
wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to intro-
duce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this 
procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in 
question. And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: 
first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the 
framework; we call them internal questions; and second, questions concerning 
the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions. 
(1950: 206)
Questions such as ‘Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?’ or ‘Did King 
Arthur actually live?’ are internal to what Carnap calls the “the thing lan-
guage”, i.e. a linguistic framework in which we can talk about spatio-tempo-
ral things and events. These questions can be answered within the framework, 
in this case, by undertaking empirical investigation. Other questions, such 
as ‘Are there spatio-temporal things?’, when understood as internal to the 
“thing language”, have a trivial affirmative answer. The same is true of ‘Are 
there numbers?’. The answer to the latter question, considered as internal to 
the linguistic framework of mathematics, is trivial, as it is entailed by trivial 
mathematical claims such as ‘There is a number greater than 5’.3
2 See Quine (1948: 13–14), but also his “On Universals” (1947: 78–80) and “Logic and 
the Reification of Universals” (1953b: 122f ). It is this position that Carnap attacks, see Carnap 
(1950: 214–215; 215 n.5). 
3 According to Carnap, ‘There are numbers’ in the internal sense is an analytic sentence 
(Carnap 1950: 209), since it follows from the also analytic sentence ‘5 is a number’. So is 
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But these questions can also be understood as external to a linguistic 
framework. The claims that traditional metaphysicians make are precisely of 
this kind: they are external to the linguistic frameworks to which they nor-
mally belong. The sentence ‘There are physical objects’, in the sense in which 
the metaphysician considers it, is external to the framework of “the thing 
language”. ‘There are numbers’, in the metaphysician’s sense, is external to 
the framework of mathematics. By uttering this sentence, the metaphysician 
is not aiming at asserting the trivial truth that the mathematician takes for 
granted. She does not wonder whether mathematics admits numbers or not, 
but commits herself to a different claim, and in particular, a substantive view 
about certain constituents of reality.
The consequence of drawing the internal-external distinction is that 
“the acceptance of a linguistic framework must not be regarded as implying 
a metaphysical doctrine concerning the reality of the entities in question” 
(Carnap 1950: 214–215). To believe so would be, according to Carnap, to 
confuse the internal sense (the one that ‘There are numbers’ has as internal to 
mathematics) with the external sense (the one that the metaphysician wants 
to assign to it). The sentence, considered as internal to mathematics, is true 
but it does not imply Platonism about numbers (or classes, or universals). In 
this way Carnap rejects Quine’s view that a theory is ontologically commit-
ted to stipulating the existence of the kind of entities that would function as 
values for the variables over which the theory quantifies.
But Carnap does not stop here, as he goes on to argue that the metaphy-
sician’s sentences are actually meaningless, precisely for being external. The 
metaphysician’s questions and answers, although they create the illusion of 
expressing thoughts, are nothing but the result of a failed attempt to make 
meaningful assertions. The only meaningful questions of existence are those 
asked within the particular linguistic frameworks to which the terms that the 
metaphysician uses belong (‘physical object’, ‘number’, ‘property’, ‘proposi-
tion’ etc). But as such they are trivial questions with trivial answers, and are 
not what the metaphysician is after.4 The mistake of traditional metaphysics 
‘There are properties’, when interpreted as internal to the “the system of thing properties”, 
because it follows from the analytic sentence ‘Red is a property’. Also ‘There are propositions’ 
is analytic, when interpreted as internally to a semantic framework that admits quantification 
over propositions, since it follows from an analytic sentence such as ‘That Chicago is large is 
a proposition’. For a discussion of these claims of analyticity see Soames (2009: 431–435). I 
agree with Haack (1976: 462) that ultimately these theses about analyticity do not play a role 
in Carnap’s argument to the effect that metaphysical claims are meaningless. 
4 Ekain Garmendia pointed out to me in personal communication that, of course, it is 
not the case that all internal existence questions are trivial: ‘Does phlogiston exist?’, or ‘Does 
anti-matter exist?’ are examples of such non-trivial, but substantial, internal existence ques-
tions. 
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is to try to reverse the order: instead of introducing a linguistic framework 
and then making existence claims within that framework, the metaphysician 
takes ontological questions as prior and independent to the introduction of 
any linguistic framework. She considers that a framework “is legitimate only 
if it can be justified by an ontological insight supplying an affirmative answer 
to the question of reality” (Carnap 1950: 214).
Not all external questions are meaningless. Carnap distinguishes practi-
cal from theoretical external questions and answers. An example of the former 
are questions concerning the adequacy of a linguistic form, such as: ‘Shall 
we introduce the predicate ‘number’ in our language with such and such 
a semantics?’. Practical question are external but nevertheless meaningful, 
because in that case the expressions of the language are not used, but men-
tioned. Theoretical questions, on the other hand, purport to be about matters 
of fact. ‘Are there numbers?’ in the metaphysician’s intended interpretation is 
a theoretical (or factual) external question. It is these questions, which pur-
port to be at the same time theoretical and external, that cannot receive an 
answer, according to Carnap, because they are meaningless.
In sum, I take it that Carnap’s (1950) anti-metaphysical argument can 
be reconstructed as having the following structure: the first premise is that 
metaphysical claims, such as ‘There are numbers’, are meant in the external 
sense (as theoretical external questions and answers). The second premise is 
that all theoretical external sentences are meaningless. Therefore, comes the 
conclusion, the sentences of metaphysics are meaningless.
II. An assessment of Carnap’s argument
Some of the most widely discussed attacks on Carnap’s strategy for identify-
ing nonsense consist in questioning the coherence of the internal-external 
distinction.5 I find Carnap’s distinction coherent, although I think he frames 
it in terms that are potentially misleading. For instance, at times he formu-
lates it as a distinction between two senses of a particular question (1950: 
209, 210, 213). Talk of two senses of a sentence begs the question against 
his own point that external questions and sentences do not have a sense, as 
they are meaningless. Carnap (1950: 213) also talks about questions of exist-
ence as being ambiguous. But again, I think this is misleading: generally, an 
expression is said to be ambiguous if it has two linguistic meanings when 
interpreted in accordance with the semantic rules of the same language. But 
5 The locus classicus of such criticism is to be found in Quine’s (1951b) “On Carnap’s 
Views on Ontology”. See Soames (2009), Yablo (1998) and Price (1997), but especially Haack 
(1976: 468), Bird (1995: 48–49) and Alspector-Kelly (2001: 106) for a discussion of these 
objections, and why they fail. 
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that is not the difference between Carnap’s internal and an external questions. 
Finally, in other places Carnap frames his distinction in terms of internal vs. 
external questions/assertions (1950: 206–209; 212). This is, I think, equally 
misleading, as it suggests that the very same question or assertion could be 
taken as external or internal. But this is obviously not what Carnap means.
I think it is more accurate to frame Carnap’s distinction as one between 
internal/external interpretations of an utterance of an expression (or inter-
nal/external uses of an expression, in the sense that it is used with the inten-
tion to be interpreted either internally or externally to a certain framework). 
Strictly speaking, it is interpretations that are internal or external to a linguis-
tic framework, not questions and assertions. I use in what follows Carnap’s 
terminology of ‘internal/external questions/assertions’ only as a shorthand for 
‘questions/assertions resulting from an internal/external interpretations’.6
Although I find Carnap’s distinction coherent, I agree with the general 
trend among Carnap’s commentators to regard his argument as failing to 
establish its conclusion.7 The reason why I find Carnap’s argument uncon-
vincing is that he does not offer a compelling reason to believe his second 
premise, in particular, that an interpretation is meaningless simply in virtue 
of being external to a particular framework. Let me elaborate on this point.
First, notice that for an interpretation of a sentence S to be external to 
the language L is simply for it to be interpreted by semantic and syntactic 
rules alien to L. However, an utterance is not meaningless just because we do 
not interpret it according to the rules of a particular language. So why think 
that it is meaningless? One reason could be that the metaphysician interprets 
her use of certain expression-forms8 as external to all languages in which E 
is assigned a meaning. Interpreting an expression-form is assigning to it a 
6 I am aware that the presentation of Carnap’s position in the previous section and the 
discussion of it in this one are not free of certain interpretive choices. For an alterative read-
ing of Carnap’s position, see Price (1997) and Thomasson (forthcoming), who believe a vi-
able Carnapian position is available through interpreting the internal-external distinction in 
terms of the use-mention distinction. However, as they acknowledge, this proposal departs 
significantly from Carnap’s original intentions. Chalmers (2009: 80–81) interprets Carnap’s 
distinction as one between two different evaluations of the same sentence, and not a distinc-
tion between two sentences, resulting from different interpretations. See also Yablo (1998) for 
a further development of Carnap’s distinction as one between literal and figurative (or ‘make-
believe’) speech. More relativist interpretations are also possible, under which Carnap’s frame-
works are not simply languages, as I have taken them to be, but rather perspectives, the sorts of 
things relativists appeal to. Eklund (forthcoming) develops and criticizes this position. 
7 The list of authors that believe Carnap’s argument is not compelling is large. See Haack 
(1976: 465) and Eklund (forthcoming) for particularly insightful discussions. According to 
Eklund, “the overall conclusion can perhaps be summarized as follows: Carnap’s importance 
for contemporary ontology is overstated.”
8 Expression-forms are phonetically, but not syntactically and not semantically, individu-
ated. So two languages can be said to have in their vocabulary the same expression-form, but 
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linguistic meaning, and for that it is necessary to make use of one linguis-
tic framework or another. An interpretation that is external to all linguistic 
frameworks is, strictly speaking, no interpretation at all.
But if this what Carnap has in mind, it looks like his argument equivo-
cates on ‘external’: the claim that external uses are meaningless is plausible 
only if ‘external’ is taken in an absolute sense, as external to all linguistic 
frameworks. On the other hand, the claim that the metaphysician’s utterance of 
‘There are numbers’ is external is only plausible if ‘external’ is taken in a relative 
sense: as external to the framework of mathematics.
It is plausible to think that the metaphysician’s existential claims are 
external to the framework of particular sciences. While the scientist postu-
lates things such as numbers, propositions, but also laws of nature, species or 
strings, the metaphysician asks whether there is anything that these concepts 
stand for, and if so, what is the nature of their referents, whether they are 
fundamental building blocks of reality etc. We may agree with Carnap that 
the metaphysician wants to know whether such things exist in a neutral, ex-
tra-theoretical sense, and not whether mathematics quantifies over numbers, 
biology over species, and string theory over strings. In doing this she steps 
outside all particular scientific theories, and interprets her sentences as exter-
nal to all scientific frameworks. But even if the sentence-forms that the meta-
physician uses are not meant to be interpreted and evaluated by appeal to the 
linguistic rules and methods of evaluation of any particular science, this does 
not mean that there is no possible linguistic framework relative to which they 
are interpretable. In particular, it is plausible to think that the metaphysician 
interprets her question ‘Are there numbers?’ relative to a particular linguis-
tic framework that shares many syntactic and semantic features with that of 
mathematics. Arguably the mathematician and the metaphysician mean the 
same by ‘number’ and the other words in the question, with the exception of 
the meaning they assign to the existential quantifier. Arguably, the two lan-
guages interpret ‘exist’ by assigning different semantic properties to it.9
So why are the metaphysician’s claims not to be taken as internal to 
a particular linguistic framework specific to metaphysics? Carnap seems to 
admit this is a position in the logical space, but at the same time to believe 
it is not one where the metaphysician is to be found. He suggests the meta-
not the same expression. That is, they assign to the same expression-form different syntactic 
and semantic properties. 
9 Again, there are alternative options of interpreting Carnap’s point here. As suggested in 
Price (2009: 330–335), even if the mathematician’s and the metaphysician’s respective notions 
of existence are different, the difference need not amount to assigning different meanings to 
the word, as I have assumed. This point affects the way Carnap should be interpreted relative 
to the reason why the metaphysician’s use of language is meaningless. As Cappelen (2013: 26) 
observes, Carnap is not particularly clear on this point. 
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physician does not provide a linguistic framework relative to which her ut-
terances could be interpreted: “Unless and until they [the metaphysicians] 
supply a clear cognitive interpretation, we are justified in our suspicion that 
their question is a pseudo-question” (Carnap 1950: 207). Indeed, if the meta-
physician fails to provide a new linguistic framework in which the question is 
to be interpreted, and assuming she interprets the question as external to the 
language of mathematics, it lacks meaning. But Carnap does not show that 
she fails to do so. He only argues that her utterances are not to be interpreted 
by the semantic rules of a scientific framework. And this is insufficient to 
support his radical anti-metaphysical conclusions.10 So, on the present read-
ing of Carnap’s argument, his deflationary claims vis-à-vis metaphysics are 
not warranted.
However, I take it that the present discussion of Carnap’s position sug-
gests that he has succeeded in producing a view of what it takes for a use of 
an expression-form to be meaningless. Carnap’s strategy for generating mean-
ingless uses of expression-forms (call it Carnap’s Strategy, or CS for short) 
could be formulated as follows:
(CS) If a speaker uses an expression-form E externally to all existent linguis-
tic frameworks, and the speaker fails to provide a new linguistic framework 
for E, then her use of E is meaningless.
It seems to me Carnap has correctly identified a way in which utterances can 
fail to be linguistically meaningful. I have focused here on semantic inter-
pretation, and have left out of CS any reference to syntactic rules, although 
these are also required in interpreting an expression-form. A claim similar to 
CS holds concerning syntactic interpretation of expression-forms. However, 
Carnap’s (1950) focus is on semantically, not syntactically, uninterpretable 
utterances. Moreover, CS amounts to only one approach to how language use 
can generate semantic uninterpretability. There are other ways in which a use 
of an expression-form can fail to be meaningful. Furthermore, there are vari-
ous notions of nonsense, not all of which involve meaningless uses of language 
(Diamond 1981: 95–96).11
Although correct as it stands, I think CS is unsatisfactory for various 
reasons. First, we want to know more about the conditions under which the 
antecedent of CS is true, and so the conclusion that a speaker’s use of an ex-
pression-form is meaningless is warranted. Second, we are interested not only 
10 The principle of verification that Carnap defended in the 1930’s, e.g. Carnap (1932) 
and Carnap (1935), was meant to do precisely the job of showing why there cannot be a 
linguistic framework for metaphysics. But no analogous principle plays that role here. 
11 One such notion is that of a category mistake. Magidor (2009: 558–561) offers a rich 
discussion of category mistakes, and argues that in some cases they should be equated with 
truth-valueless sentences, not meaningless ones. 
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in a mechanism for generating meaningless utterances, but also in recognizing 
them as such. This should be useful in assessing Carnap’s claim that the meta-
physician’s use of existence questions is meaningless. In the next section I de-
velop a more sophisticated version of CS within an externalist meta-semantic 
framework, which offers a good starting point to address these issues.12
III. Externalism and meaninglessness
In terms of a distinction Stalnaker (1997: 535) proposes, externalist meta-
semantic considerations are foundational, and not descriptive. They offer an 
account of the facts that need to obtain in order for linguistic expressions to 
have a particular meaning. In Stalnaker’s words, they aim at discovering “what 
it is about the capacities, customs, practices, or mental states of a speaker 
or community of speakers that makes it the case that an expression has the 
semantic value that it has” (Stalnaker 1997: 542). In what follows I briefly 
introduce externalism, and focus on those aspects of it that are relevant to my 
purposes.13
The paradigmatic externalist view concerning proper names, as Kripke 
formulates it, imposes three conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for 
a use of a proper name to have a referent: 1) a successful initial baptism, per-
formed either by ostension or by description; 2) a chain of uses of the name 
that preserves the reference; and, finally, 3) the condition (or conditions) 
that a language user must fulfil to become a competent user of that name. 
Competence requires that, “When the name is ‘passed from link to link’, the 
receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the 
same reference as the man from whom he heard it” (Kripke 1980: 96). It is 
not a condition on competence that the speaker have descriptive knowledge 
that determines the object named as the referent of the name. Whenever the 
speaker uses the name with the intention to refer to whatever is the referent 
of the name in the linguistic community, the speaker succeeds in referring to 
the object named.14
12 An anonymous referee points out (if I understand him or her correctly) that, apart 
from the question concerning what makes an external use meaningless, there is a related ques-
tion: why do we seem to understand external existential claims like “There are propositions”? 
The referee suggests an answer to this question: we wrongly think it has meaning because we 
think of an external question by analogy with something that does have meaning, in particular, 
its internal counterpart. This is an interesting suggestion. However, it is not my intention to 
discuss in this paper the phenomenological question concerning the source of the appearance 
of understanding that meaningless expressions may have.
13 See Wikforss (2008) for an overview of different externalist theses. 
14 Other authors formulate similar competence conditions, for instance Soames (2002: 
70) and Sainsbury (2005: 113). 
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Kripke (1980), Putnam (1975a), Devitt (1981) and others extend these 
meta-semantic considerations to natural kind terms such as ‘water’ and terms 
for physical magnitudes such as ‘temperature’. The extension of these terms 
is fixed by mechanisms that have a social and historical dimension, in ways 
that are analogous in important respects with the case of proper names. The 
conditions for competence are also similar in that they do not require that 
the speaker have descriptive knowledge that would enable her to identify 
instances of that natural kind.
But the externalist considerations are even wider in scope. Kripke sets 
the basis for a socio-historical theory of linguistic meaning in general, and not 
only of reference. As Joseph Almog notes,
The historical chain preserves the linguistic meaning of any expression. In the 
case of names, all there is to this meaning is to stand for the given referent. Ergo, 
the chain preserves the fact that the name stands for that referent. (1984: 482)
The case of referential expressions is just a particular case of a more general 
claim concerning the determination of linguistic meaning. Tyler Burge makes 
the same point without using the metaphor of the chain of users linked to 
one another: the conventional linguistic meaning “may vary with the individ-
ual’s environment, even as the individual’s activities, individualistically and 
nonintentionally specified, are held constant” (Burge 1986: 273). In Burge 
(1986) and Burge (1989) he defends anti-individualistic conclusions con-
cerning semantic properties. He proposes an externalist view of the linguistic 
meaning of a large class of expressions applicable to empirical objects, stuffs, 
properties, and events.15
According to this general externalist perspective on meaning, the factors 
that individuate the linguistic meaning of expressions include non-individu-
alistic facts, and so may vary with the individual’s environment. Depending 
on the version of the thesis, the relevant environmental facts are social facts 
concerning linguistic practice and/or physical facts concerning the unobserv-
able essential properties of the entity, stuff or event the speaker refers to. As 
Donnellan (1993) points out, these two versions of externalism need to be 
carefully distinguished.16 For present purposes I shall assume that the mean-
ing of expression E (at least for certain categories of expressions) depends on 
the speaker’s social environment (and varies with the social environment) and 
in particular, on the linguistic practice of using E in the speaker’s linguistic 
15 Burge (1989: 283) discusses this thesis in relation to a wide class of expressions, in-
cluding ‘tiger’, ‘water’, ‘mud’, ‘stone’, ‘tree’, ‘bread’, ‘knife’, ‘chair’, ‘edge’, ‘shadow’, ‘baby’, 
‘walk’, ‘fight’. 
16 And they also need to be distinguished from the claim that use determines meaning. 
The externalist thesis is a thesis about dependence, or variation. It is different from, although 
compatible with, the former thesis about determination. 
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community, even if all the facts about the speaker’s personal history as well as 
physical constitution, individualistically and nonintentionally characterized, 
are held constant.
A consequence of this broadly construed social externalism concerning 
the determination of meaning is that there are certain relations between lin-
guistic competence and social practice. In particular, an individual can achieve 
competence in using an expression E even if she does not have access to any 
correct description of the relevant social facts. In particular, the speaker need 
not have the ability to identify the linguistic practice as the practice of using 
the word in such and such a way, following such and such semantic rules. 
This parallels the externalist claims about competence with proper names 
and natural kind terms: the reference of these expressions varies with facts 
about the physical (in this case) environment that are normally not acces-
sible to the speaker; therefore, the competent speaker need not have access 
to these facts, i.e. possess uniquely identifying descriptive knowledge of the 
referents. On a social externalist view, the semantic properties vary with social 
facts about linguistic practice in the relevant language community that need 
not be accessible to the individual. Therefore, a competent user may lack an 
account of the semantic rules that members of the relevant social community 
follow. Having an explicit account of the semantic properties of a word is not 
required for linguistic competence with that word. As Burge puts it, speakers 
need not have the ability to offer a correct “explication” of the meaning of 
the words, where a speaker’s explication of the meaning of a word is “what 
the individual would give, under some reflection, as his understanding of the 
word” (1989: 282). In other words, in order for a speaker’s utterance of an 
expression-form E to have the linguistic meaning that E has in the relevant 
linguistic community (to be the word with that form) the speaker need not 
have access to a correct characterization of the meaning assigned to E by that 
linguistic community.
This is a negative thesis, concerning what competence does not require. 
What is required for competence? Gareth Evans (1982) suggests an answer 
to this question, building on Kripke’s account of initiation into the use of a 
proper name. He argues that Kripke’s point about names is an instance of a 
more general principle that is not particularly concerned with the preserva-
tion of reference. The fact that “individual speakers exploit general practices” 
is true of many other semantic properties. He formulates the following “gen-
eral principle”:
if a speaker uses a word with the manifest intention to participate in such-and-
such a practice, in which the word is used with such and such semantic proper-
ties, then the word, as used by him, will possess just those semantic properties. 
This principle has as much application to the use by speakers of words like 
263A. MOLDOVAN: Carnap’s External Questions and Semantic Externalism
‘agronomist’, ‘monetarism’ as the like as to their use of proper names. (Evans 
1982: 387)
This point is sometimes made in terms of having the right ‘deferential inten-
tion’. As Putnam (1975) argued, not everyone in a linguistic community has 
the correct criteria of application of all the words in the language. This is what 
he calls The Universal Hypothesis of the Division of Linguistic Labour:
Every linguistic community… possesses at least some terms whose associated 
‘criteria’ are known only to a subset of the speakers who acquire the terms and 
whose use by the other speakers depends upon a structured cooperation be-
tween them and the speakers in the relevant subsets. (1975: 228)
The speakers in the relevant subsets are what Putnam calls ‘the experts’, i.e. 
those who do posses the correct application conditions and have virtually 
perfect mastery of the word. But one need not be an expert in elms in order 
to use the word ‘elm’ correctly. Instead, one must have a deferential intention, 
that is, the intention to use the word with whatever criteria of application ex-
perts assign to it, and consequently, to be disposed to be corrected by experts 
in one’s application of the word. Having the right deferential intention allows 
one to use an expression-form with the meaning it has in the linguistic com-
munity to which one defers. This is not only a sufficient condition for such 
use – as Evans points out in the above quote – but also a necessary condition 
for the use of an expression (unless one is an expert, in Putnam’s sense of the 
term). The social dimension of linguistic meaning requires the speaker’s par-
ticipation in the relevant practice.
If having the right deferential intentions is a necessary condition for a 
non-expert’s use of words to have the customary meaning they have in the 
relevant linguistic community, then the following thesis suggests itself (call it 
the No Deference Principle, or NDP for short):
(NDP) If a non-expert uses an expression-form E without the manifest in-
tention to participate in a linguistic practice P in which E is used with a 
certain linguistic meaning, her use of E does not acquire the linguistic mean-
ing it has in P.
To say that a use of an expression-form E does not acquire a particular lin-
guistic meaning is not yet to say that it is meaningless. However, if the speaker 
does not assign to the expression-form E a new meaning – independently of 
what meaning it has in P – we do have evidence for a meaningless use of E. 
It is not NDP alone, but NDP in conjunction with these additional circum-
stances, that leads to the conclusion that her use of E is meaningless. That is, 
the way a non-expert uses an expression-form leads to meaninglessness if she 
lacks the right deferential intentions and, at the same time, does not stipulate 
a novel meaning to her use of the expression-form.
264 Prolegomena 13 (2) 2014
IV. NDP and metaphysics
I have initially advertised myself as presenting a strategy for generating and 
identifying meaningless uses of expressions that bears important similarities 
to Carnap’s own proposal. Does the result meet the expectations? I think it 
does. Using an expression-form E as internal (in Carnap’s sense) to an existent 
language L in which E receives a meaning parallels the notion of using E with 
the intention that E be interpreted relative to some existing linguistic practice 
PL in which E receives a meaning. That is, an internal use is a use governed 
by deferential intentions. To use E as external to L is to use E without reli-
ance on the corresponding linguistic practice PL. That is, external uses may 
be characterized as uses in which S does not have the intention to participate 
in linguistic practice PL in which E is used with a certain linguistic mean-
ing. An external use, under certain conditions, is meaningless, according to 
Carnap. It is meaningless if S uses E externally to all existent languages, and 
does not provide a new meaning to E. The externalist strategy I propose, 
based on NDP, also finds evidence for lack of meaning in those cases in which 
the speaker does not defer to the relevant linguistic community or any other 
linguistic community, and at the same time does not stipulate a novel mean-
ing to the expression-form. So, I suggest there is a really significant parallel 
between the two strategies. Therefore, the proposal I have developed may be 
seen as an interpretation of CS from an externalist metasemantic perspec-
tive.17
The theoretical benefits of this interpretation of CS is that it suggests a 
way in which Carnap’s insightful but rather enigmatic distinction between 
internal and external uses could be understood. But does it shed some light 
on Carnap’s claims that the metaphysician’s use of existence sentences is 
17 An anonymous referee suggests that my interpretation of Carnap’s distinction between 
internal and external uses as a distinction between deferential and non-deferential uses does 
not do justice to what Carnap had in mind. For Carnap an external question is a question 
posed from outside – and not from within – a certain linguistic framework. But, crucially, 
at the same time it is a question about the framework. They are “questions concerning the 
existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole” (Carnap 1950: 206). And so, construing 
externality as lack of intention to participate in a certain linguistic practice seems to leave out 
the idea that questioning the existence of the system as a whole makes no sense. I plead guilty 
on this accusation. I have left out this aspect of Carnap’s characterization of external questions 
because I am not sure what exactly to make of it: if the external use of ‘Are there numbers?’ 
is indeed meaningless, then it does not make sense to say that it is a question concerning the 
reality of the system of numbers. It is simply meaningless. It may purport to be about a system 
of entities, or it may give that impression to a friend of metaphysics. But that is a wrong im-
pression, if Carnap is right. Second, my concern here is primarily with the reason why external 
questions are meaningless. On my interpretation, the fact that they (purport to) question the 
existence of the system of entities is not the source of their meaninglessness. So I have not put 
much emphasis on this aspect. 
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meaningless? This is a delicate issue, and a careful and detailed discussion of it 
goes beyond the purpose of the present paper. But the strategy for generating 
meaningless uses of expression-forms based on NDP points at a way in which 
Carnap’s claims about metaphysics could be assessed. In particular, to say that 
the metaphysician’s use of ‘Are there numbers?’ is external to any linguistic 
framework in which this expression-form receives an interpretation is to say 
that the metaphysician refuses to defer to any linguistic practice in which this 
expression-form receives meaning. Assuming that the only relevant linguistic 
practice in this case is that of mathematics, the claim is that the metaphysi-
cian refuses to defer to the linguistic practice of mathematics for the meaning 
of the question. Moreover, we may agree that the focus of the debate is the 
way the metaphysician uses ‘exists’, and not any of the other words of the 
question. This is what Carnap suggests as well, given that all his examples of 
external questions and sentences involve existential claims. So it looks like it 
is the use of ‘exists’ (and its variants in English) that makes all the difference 
between an internal and an external interpretation of ‘Are there numbers?’.
This diagnosis is supported by externalist considerations: the metaphysi-
cian does exhibit in many ways her intention to use ‘number’ precisely as the 
mathematician uses it, and so to participate in the same linguistic practice 
(for instance, by quoting, referring to, and explicitly or implicitly subscribing 
to, claims that mathematicians make about numbers). By this she expresses 
her intention to talk about whatever mathematicians talk about when they 
use the word ‘number’.
But what about ‘exists’? In line with Evans’s remark quoted above, the 
metaphysician must have the manifest intention to participate in the linguis-
tic practice of mathematics. How could such an intention become manifest? 
One way is for the metaphysician to explicitly say that she intends to use the 
word in precisely the way the mathematicians use it, and to mean precisely 
what he means by it. Typically, this is not the case. But she need not do so in 
order to defer. A deferential intention need not be conceived as a consciously 
entertained and explicitly formulated mental state. It is not as if the meta-
physician need to consciously think in foro interno that she uses the expres-
sion-form with whatever meaning it has in mathematics, or to express such 
intention publicly.
The other way in which the metaphysician could make manifest her 
intention to participate in the linguistic practice of mathematics with respect 
to existential questions and sentences is for her to use the word precisely in 
the way it is used in mathematics. Now, it may be argued that she does not 
do this. When the mathematician claims numbers exist she does not make a 
trivial claim – the one that follows logically from the claim that 5 is a number. 
Instead, she tends to attribute to numbers a special kind of property, maybe 
one in the vicinity of reality. But, assuming there is a difference between the 
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respective uses of ‘exists’, are these sufficiently different as to warrant the con-
clusion that she does not have the manifest intention to defer?
And, if indeed she does not defer, is it not the case that the metaphysi-
cian manages to introduce a new meaningful use for ‘exists’? The radical anti-
metaphysical conclusion follows only if the metaphysician does not defer but 
at the same time fails to provide a new meaning to her use of ‘exists’. Only 
in that case we are warranted to conclude that her question is meaningless. 
She certainly does not introduce a novel meaning to ‘exists’ by stipulation, 
but it may be argued that her use of ‘exists’ determines a new meaning to the 
word.
These are intricate questions that I mention here but which I do not 
pursue in detail. Pursuing them requires discussing issues related to the epis-
temology of intention attribution and the nature of the deferential intention, 
which go beyond the scope of this paper. However, what I do hope to have 
achieved here is indicate a promising way in which Carnap’s distinction be-
tween internal and external uses of expressions could be interpreted and his 
anti-metaphysical conclusions assessed.
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